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Abstract
One of the most significant economic trends in the last
decades has been the integration of countries in inter-
national markets. What have been the consequences of
global economic integration upon the territorial organi-
zation of the states? Has it contributed to centralize
powers or to further decentralization? The literature so
far has provided inconclusive evidence. In this article
we shed new light on the relationship between eco-
nomic globalization and territorial politics by using a
varied source of data such as the Regional Authority
Index, and the KOF indices of globalization for the
period 1970–2010. Results show that economic globali-
zation is positively associated to decentralization,
particularly in those countries with more regionalist
parties and where levels of inequality are lower.
1 | INTRODUCTION
In the last decades, two simultaneous trends have taken place that have changed the nature of
the nation-state, namely globalization and decentralization. Power has migrated from central
governments upward, with the creation of international organizations, and countries have
opened up their economies to more global interdependence and participation in global markets,
limiting the room to maneuver of national governments (Hellwig, 2014). According to the KOF
indices developed by Dreher (2006), the average globalization levels have increased by 51%
between 1970 and 2010.1 At the same time, there is extensive evidence showing that powers
have significantly migrated from central government downward. In their seminal study, Marks,
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Hooghe, and Schakel (2008a) show that there has been a marked increase in the level of
regional authority over the past 70 years. Of the 42 countries that they analyze for the period
1950–2006, 29 of those countries saw an increase in their levels of regional authority, while
11 saw no change, and only two increased the centralization of authority (Marks et al., 2008a,
p. 168). Thus, both phenomena—globalization and decentralization—characterize the evolu-
tion of politics in the last decades. Although both unfold at the same time, the literature has not
yet provided a clear account of how these two processes are related: Are these two separate pro-
cesses that just happen to take place at the same time, or is there a systematic relationship
between the two of them?
This lack of empirical work is even more flagrant because a review of the theories that
connect globalization with the vertical distribution of powers within states points to different,
even opposite, expectations. On the one hand, globalization may result in higher levels of fis-
cal centralization. This is the main argument posed by Garrett and Rodden (2006), who state
that if globalization makes countries more vulnerable to external shocks, then we may expect
a reinforcement of the mechanisms of macroeconomic stabilization and interregional risk
sharing via the enhancement of central government's fiscal authority (Garrett & Rodden,
2006, p. 278).
Alternatively, globalization may result in higher levels of decentralization (Stegarescu,
2009). This may happen through different mechanisms: allocative efficiency, economic competi-
tion, and demands for self-determination. Decentralization may represent a more appropriate
institutional context to cope with the increase of competition for capital and foreign investment
that result from economic globalization. Yet globalization may also increase demands for self-
determination by changing the relative costs and benefits for certain territorial units to continue
belonging to a nation-state. In this context, decentralization may emerge as an institutional
reform implemented to appease secessionist demands.
This article contributes to providing a better understanding of the relationship between
globalization and decentralization in advanced democracies in three ways. First, it introduces a
nuanced review of the causal mechanisms that, according to different strands of literature
(Public Choice School, Welfare Economics, Secessionism, etc.) may drive the relationship
between decentralization and globalization. Second, it provides new empirical evidence on the
impact of globalization upon decentralization using a large database and new measures of
decentralization and globalization. The empirical relationship between globalization and the
territorial organization of the state has been largely overlooked, and empirical comparative
work based on a large-N analysis exploring this question has been scarce. Using data from
78 countries for the 1970–2010 period, our empirical analyses show that globalization has a pos-
itive effect on decentralization. The effect is very robust to alternative specifications and its
magnitude is moderate. Third, we provide some evidence of the contextual conditions that can
amplify or mitigate this relationship. More specifically, we find that the relationship between
globalization and decentralization is stronger in countries where regionalist parties have a
larger parliamentary representation. Likewise, the effect of globalization is weaker (or even
works in the opposite direction) in contexts of high regional economic inequality. These condi-
tions point to different political and economic incentives to decentralize when countries are
exposed to global economic integration.
The article proceeds as follows: The next section reviews the main political and economic
arguments that the literature has provided linking globalization with decentralization. In
Section 3, we present the data and methodology that we will use to address the research ques-
tion and discuss how these relate to previous comparative work. Section 4 presents the main
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results of the article and Section 5 tests the contextual conditions. Finally, Section 6 concludes
and provides some next steps for a research agenda on this topic.
2 | GLOBALIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION: A
CENTRIFUGAL OR CENTRIPETAL RELATIONSHIP?
The literature on the domestic consequences of globalization is extensive. However, this litera-
ture has mostly focused on the impact of globalization on national policies and economic insti-
tutions. This literature addresses how states react to globalized competition and global
economic interdependence and the main expectation is that, in order to attract capital and be
more efficient in the global competition, domestic policies converge in spending cuts, lower
taxes, balanced budgets, and a general weakening of the state's productive and redistributive
capacity (e.g., Hays, 2003; Marshall & Fisher, 2015). The literature has also extensively studied
how national institutions support the convergence process through institutional reforms that
promote liberalization (Simmons & Elkins, 2004), introducing flexibility in areas such as labor
markets (Mosley & Uno, 2007; Pandya, 2010), or banking (Hellmann, Murdock, & Stiglitz,
2000), among many others.
However, support for this hypothesis is mixed and many have argued that the effect of glob-
alization has been to widen the preexisting differences among advanced capitalist political econ-
omies (Hellwig, 2019). There is also literature showing evidence that globalization can actually
have the reverse effect. The so-called compensation hypothesis predicts that levels of social
spending increase to buffer the exposure to international volatility and shocks of economic glob-
alization (Hwang & Lee, 2014; Leibrecht, Klien, & Onaran, 2011; Meinhard & Potrafke, 2012).
Despite this abundant research on how globalization affects domestic politics, the empirical
relationship between globalization and the territorial organization of the state has been largely
overlooked. Garrett and Rodden's (2006) analysis perhaps represents the most relevant work
testing the direct relationship between globalization and decentralization with a systematic
large-N analysis. These authors conclude that there is a small positive effect of globalization on
centralization, although they acknowledge that fiscal centralization need not imply other forms
of centralization and that it is compatible with cultural and political autonomy (Garrett &
Rodden, 2006, pp. 278, 283). Conversely, Stegarescu (2009) finds an effect in the opposite direc-
tion: More economic integration can increase levels of fiscal decentralization. Finally,
Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev (2009) do not find any relevant effect of economic globaliza-
tion on decentralization.2
This empirical uncertainty is also related to ambiguous theoretical expectations. A review of
the more specific theoretical literature on the drivers of decentralization reforms and of its asso-
ciated benefits can point to opposite empirical predictions. One of the reasons why the litera-
ture comes up with different expectations on the relationship between decentralization and
globalization is that the latter has implications upon multiple dimensions (for instance, inequal-
ity, vulnerability to economic shocks or territorial tensions) and each of these dimensions may
in turn have different effects upon decentralization or affect the different dimensions of decen-
tralization (fiscal, political) differently. In other words, there are conflicting expectations about
what the effect of globalization on decentralization might be, which makes the empirical pre-
dictions less straightforward and potentially contingent upon the political or economic context.
In Table 1 we provide a summary of the main theoretical arguments that associate globaliza-
tion to (de)centralization of power.
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The first argument is about globalization increasing jurisdictions’ heterogeneity in the
demands for public goods. In a globalized context, subnational jurisdictions may interact with a
broader range of governmental and nongovernmental actors that participate in the acts of
governing (Hueglin, 1999). Higher levels of interdependence between local, regional, national,
and international actors may open up opportunities for separated responses, so decentralization
may help jurisdictions to respond to interactions in a more differentiated way and according to
their specific policy preferences. Decentralization enhances allocative efficiency in a context in
which, as a result of globalization and the increasing number of actors, preferences become
more heterogeneous.3 This argument echoes one of the most theorized benefits of decentraliza-
tion, namely that it brings decisions closer to the preferences of the jurisdiction's population,
enhancing allocative efficiency (Oates, 1972). Bringing government closer to the people allows
jurisdictions with heterogeneous preferences to manage differentiated demands for public goods
by pursuing their own policy and economic strategies (Arze del Granado, Martinez-Vazquez, &
McNab, 2018).
The second argument speaks to a recent literature that explores the conditions for sub-
national jurisdictions to benefit from the globalization of markets. Globalization facilitates
access to external sources of finance through economic integration and “as cross-border trade
and financial linkages become stronger, and restrictions are removed on international trade
and capital flows, subnational governments may have greater access to alternative sources of
deficit financing” (De Mello, 2005, p. 2). Borrowing from the Public Choice School (Brennan &
Buchanan, 1980) and market-preserving federalism literature (see Qian & Weingast, 1997) we
may expect decentralization to contribute to enhance subnational governments’ access to finan-
cial markets by promoting a cost-efficient provision of public goods. The mechanism to enhance
efficiency in the provision of public goods is competition among jurisdictions: Competition for
capital and labor prevents local authorities from pursuing an opportunistic behavior and
assures local governments’ fiscal discipline (Filippetti & Sacchi, 2016).
TABLE 1 Theoretical mechanisms that relate globalization and decentralization
Argument Implications of globalization Benefits of de(centralization)
Predicted
relationship
Allocative
efficiency
Increases heterogeneity in the
demand of public goods, due to
higher interdependence between
governmental and
nongovernmental actors
Decentralization allows higher
allocative efficiency
Positive
Productive
efficiency
Globalization facilitates access to
external sources of finance
through economic integration
Decentralization increases higher
economic efficiency and enhances
fiscal discipline to allow
jurisdictions to attract capital
Positive
Ethnic conflict Globalization increases the costs and
reduces the benefits for minorities
to stay in big states
Decentralization allows countries to
appease the secessionist demands
of ethnic or cultural minorities
Positive
(self-rule)
Mutualization
of risk
Globalization increases vulnerability
to economic shocks
Centralization of fiscal authority
allows for a stronger redistributive
role of the central government
Negative
4 JURADO AND LEÓN
The previous two arguments (allocative efficiency and productive efficiency) have a func-
tionalist nature: Globalization changes the acts of governing in different forms and decentrali-
zation may emerge as an institutional reform that allows countries to cope with the challenges
posed by the new forms of governance (Jun & Wright, 1996). The third argument is related to
the role of decentralization in appeasing territorial conflict in contexts where globalization
increases the costs for subnational jurisdictions to remain as part of a big state. Some scholars
have argued that under globalization the ideal size of the state decreases because efficiency
gains from unification become smaller (Bolton & Roland, 1997). Traditionally, it has been con-
sidered that big states provide efficiency gains related to the internalization of markets and
defense, while they also involve costs associated with the homogeneity that a centralized state
imposes upon heterogeneous populations (Alesina & Spolaore, 1997; Desmet, Le Breton,
Ortuño-Ortín, & Weber, 2011). When economic integration is low, the size of the country in
equilibrium is larger, as bigger countries have bigger markets (assuming that domestic trade is
always less costly than international trade). As economic integration increases, the size of the
state becomes less important to access larger markets. Where populations are large and diverse,
centralization involves more coordination problems and distance between the average public
policy individuals prefer and the actual public policies provided. Using Barro's (1991) words, as
cited in Alesina and Spolaore (1997), “…(a) large country is also likely to have a diverse popula-
tion that is difficult for the central government to satisfy.” Hence, as economic integration
increases the costs of heterogeneity become more visible and can outweigh the benefits of keep-
ing a larger state together. Pressures to accommodate heterogeneity may result in decentraliza-
tion reforms as a way to appease conflict among strong cultural or ethnic minorities for whom
the costs of staying in a centralized setting are higher.
Globalization may also increase ethnic conflict through its potential asymmetric economic
impact across territories. As Sambanis (2006) argues, globalization can have asymmetric shocks
in a country and, in large and heterogeneous states with regional ethnic groups, concentrated
shocks might intensify conflict between them and the state. The effect of globalization might be
conditional on previous levels of conflict. “In those regions where there were positive levels of
conflict previously, even if governments try to provide social insurance against globalization-
related risks, separatist conflict is likely to increase since the government's promises and pro-
grams are unlikely to be effective or credible” (Sambanis, 2006, p. 224). Thus, the decrease in
the efficiency gains associated with large states caused by globalization may spur demands for
self-recognition in ethnically and regionally diverse countries (Sambanis & Milanovic, 2011).
Political and fiscal decentralization reforms may be implemented as a solution to contain seces-
sionist demands by ethnic minorities. Brancati (2014), however, puts this hypothesis to the test
and finds no effect that European economic integration has spurred electoral support for sepa-
ratist parties.
Finally, a fourth argument is that the economic effects of globalization may also provide
incentives to centralize authority. Higher levels of economic integration may increase a coun-
try's vulnerability to asymmetric regional shocks. These asymmetries may in turn result in
reforms aimed at increasing the mutualization of risk through redistribution (Beramendi,
2012). The latter argument—globalization increasing the incentives for centralization of
power—is presented by Garrett and Rodden (2006) in their seminal research. They focus on the
effect of globalization upon one form of centralization, namely fiscal centralization. These
authors state that the institutional response to the increase of economic vulnerability caused by
globalization is the creation of mechanisms of macroeconomic stabilization and interregional
risk sharing, which involves a more prominent role of the central government in the economy
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through the centralization of fiscal authority.4 In this case, centralization represents a response
to palliate the consequences of globalization upon national economies, although Garrett and
Rodden acknowledge that the impact of globalization upon fiscal centralization can be compati-
ble with simultaneous increases in subnational political autonomy (Garrett & Rodden,
2006, p. 282).
In summary, a review of the theoretical mechanisms show that globalization can be both
positively and negatively associated with decentralization, although it is the positive correlation
that stands out more prominently in a review of the theoretical arguments. In the next sections,
we will test the relationship between globalization and decentralization and its contextual con-
ditions using a varied source of data in 78 countries and for the period 1970–2010. The analyses
provide an encompassing empirical account of the correlation between economic integration
and changes in the vertical distribution of power within states and the contextual factors that
may moderate the relationship.
3 | DATA AND METHODS
As we argued in the previous section, the most important contributions to the study of the rela-
tionship between decentralization and globalization using a large-N comparative analysis are
Garrett and Rodden (2006) and Stegarescu (2009). We advance over previous empirical work by
using improved measures of globalization and decentralization; by conducting the analysis over
a larger sample of countries and years; and by testing for some of the contextual conditions that
may moderate that relationship.
First, we use a different operationalization of globalization. Trade openness and capital
account openness have been the standard proxies used to operationalize globalization in early
works in the area. However, single measures used as proxies of globalization have been criti-
cized for only tapping into a very specific dimension of the phenomenon (Gygli, Haelg,
Potrafke, & Sturm, 2019, p. 544). In this article, we operationalize globalization using the KOF
index created by Dreher (2006) and developed further by Dreher et al. (2008), as it combines
several variables that measure different aspects of globalization into a single index and has
become the most extensively employed index in the literature during the last years. More specif-
ically, we use the updated version of the KOF economic index provided by Gygli et al. (2019),
which provides a more nuanced account of economic globalization by distinguishing between
trade and financial globalization and differentiating between its de facto and de jure dimensions.
Note that the theoretical arguments presented in Section 2 and summarized in Table 1 are asso-
ciated to the economic kind of globalization. Two of our arguments (allocative efficiency and
productive efficiency) have a functionalist nature, as decentralization emerges as an institu-
tional reform that allows countries to both provide a heterogeneous response to a more varied
and increasing interaction with nongovernment actors (allocative efficiency) and increase eco-
nomic efficiency to allow subnational jurisdictions to attract capital (productive efficiency). The
other two arguments (ethnic conflict and mutualization of risk) are also associated to economic
openness, which according to “ethnic conflict argument” decreases the benefits for regions of
remaining in a big state (so decentralization emerges to prevent ethnic conflict), and in the
“mutualization argument” economic globalization is associated to the potential emergence of
regionally asymmetric economic shocks (so centralization increases as a way to mutualize
risks).
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The KOF economic globalization index characterizes globalization as “long distance flows
of goods, capital and services as well as information and perceptions that accompany market
exchanges” (Dreher, 2006, p. 1092). The index is a composite measure of two subindices: trade
globalization and financial globalization.5 We use the general KOF economic index as the main
independent variable. However, as trade and financial openness may have different effects upon
some of the theoretical mediating variables between globalization and decentralization (such as
economic shocks or interregional inequalities), we also run the analyses separately for the spe-
cific components of the general index in order to explore whether the effect varies across differ-
ent dimensions of economic integration.
A potential limitation of the KOF index, as many other globalization indices, is that it mea-
sures globalization at the national level, which overlooks within-country variation in the expo-
sure to and regulation of trade and financial openness and often disregards the geographical
distribution of interdependences (Martens et al., 2015, quoted in Gygli et al., 2019, p. 549).
National measures of globalization may hinder significant asymmetries in the regional intensity
of globalization that are important to understand its impact upon decentralization. However,
the advantages of using KOF economic globalization index clearly offset its potential limita-
tions, as it provides data for the largest number of countries and years (it ranges from 1970 to
2010). Descriptive statistics of these indices are presented in Table A.1 in the Appendix S1,
alongside all variables employed in the article.
A second empirical advancement of this article over previous analyses in the area is that we
explore the association between globalization and the institutional dimensions of decentraliza-
tion. We operationalize decentralization using Hooghe et al.'s (2016) Regional Authority Index
(RAI). This index—initially created by Hooghe, Marks, and Schakel (2008)—measures the
authority of regional governments in 81 democracies or quasi-democracies over the period
1950–2010. Regional authority is operationalized along 10 dimensions, so it not only captures
the extent to which subnational governments exercise formal authority, but also whether they
can effectively exercise those powers (Marks, Hooghe, & Schakel, 2008b). In this article we
operationalize decentralization using the RAI index and its two main different components
(self-rule and shared-rule). Garrett and Rodden (2006) and Stegarescu (2009) use subnational
expenditure and revenues to measure a country's level of fiscal decentralization. These mea-
sures were very popular in the studies on decentralization of the nineties and early 2000s (see,
for example, Lane and Ersson (1999), Castles (1999), or Fisman and Gatti (2002), among
others). However, as Schakel (2008) argues, fiscal indicators fail to capture subnational authori-
ties’ decision-making powers and they do not differentiate between decision-making authority
and subnational powers over policy implementation (Stegarescu, 2005). By using the RAI index
we purport to provide a more encompassing operationalization of decentralization.
We estimate three different types of econometric models. First, our main specification is a
time series cross-sectional (TSCS) model with fixed effects, in which we explore within-country
variation. This model allows us to capture whether changes in levels of exposure to economic
globalization are associated with variation in levels of regional authority. Second, we replicate
this model using panel-corrected-standard-errors (PCSE) and country fixed-effects, as Beck and
Katz (1996) propose. This model corrects for the problems that might arise in panels with time
and panel correlated errors. Third, we use TSCS with random effects that allow us to explore
between-country variation. These models capture whether countries that are more globalized
are also the ones that have higher levels of regional authority, as opposed to within-country
increases in (de)centralization that are captured in the fixed-effects models. We also run a series
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of robustness checks, described later, by including a first-order autoregressive term and lagged
dependent variables.
We also run the models with and without covariates. Although models with covariates rep-
resent our baseline specification, by running the models without covariates we can test how
parsimonious the results are and show that our results do not depend on the inclusion of a spe-
cific set of covariates. This is even more important as we have included a set of covariates simi-
lar to Garrett and Rodden's models. Accordingly, we can more confidently state that any
difference between their conclusions and ours is essentially the result of our improved measures
of decentralization and globalization and are not driven by the addition of spurious third vari-
ables. Specifically, our models include the area of the country, the total population, the urban
population, the level of GDP per capita (in its logged form), and a measure of how democratic
the country is.6
Finally, the mechanisms whereby globalization may have an effect upon decentralization
are processes that may take some time to unfold. In order to capture these dynamics, avoid
endogeneity concerns, and show that this is a sequential process, we use a lagged measure of
globalization.7
4 | THE RELATION BETWEEN ECONOMIC
GLOBALIZATION AND DECENTRALIZATION
In this article we explore whether levels of economic globalization, defined as countries’
degree of integration in the global economy, is associated to their level of (de)centralization.
Countries might face an institutional dilemma. According to the theoretical arguments
reviewed earlier, they may have incentives to decentralize as the devolution of power to
smaller units may allow for a more flexible specialization to compete in the global economy,
alongside satisfying political incentives for self-determination and demands for secession. Yet
the increase in volatility in the global economy might also give national governments incen-
tives to centralize fiscal authority in order to mutualize risks through redistribution. We have
remained neutral in terms of which effect can be stronger and left it as an empirical question
that we address in this analysis.
Table 2 presents the main results of the article by regressing the Regional Authority Index
on the KOF Economic Globalization index. We include the three types of estimations described
earlier: TSCS with fixed-effects, panel-corrected-standard-errors with country effects, and TSCS
with random effects models. In addition, to show that the results are not driven by the inclusion
of specific covariates, we present the results with and without control variables. Finally, as we
argued earlier, we expect the effect of globalization to unfold over time, so we introduce the
KOF Economic Globalization index in the models with a lag of a year. A lagged independent
variable allows us to rule out whether the potential relationship between decentralization and
globalization is spurious (due to the fact that the two processes could take place simultaneously
due to an omitted variable). In addition, the temporal lag also reduces the risk of endogeneity
and reverse causality.8
Results show a remarkable positive effect of globalization upon decentralization: When
countries open up and integrate globally, the Regional Authority Index exhibits a significant
increase. The effect is robust to the inclusion of fixed effects and covariates. Table 2 shows that
the results hold in all specifications. The inclusion of control variables reduces the magnitude
of the effect of globalization, but there are no relevant changes in the results between models
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TABLE 2 Economic globalization and regional authority
Dependent variable: Regional Authority Index
(2.1) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4) (2.5) (2.6)
TSCS
random-effects
TSCS
fixed-effects
PCSE + country
dummies
TSCS
random-effects
TSCS
fixed-effects
PCSE + country
dummies
KOF Economic
Globalization
Index
0.151*** 0.152*** 0.152*** 0.0379*** 0.0385*** 0.0385***
(0.00642) (0.00644) (0.00645) (0.00950) (0.00957) (0.00785)
Covariates No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,381 2,381 2,381 1,408 1,408 1,408
R-squared 0.194 0.942 0.233 0.977
Number of countries 77 77 77 74 74 74
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .1.; **p < .05.; ***p < .01.
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with and without covariates. The coefficients of the lagged globalization variables suggest that
the institutional effects of globalization unfold over a period of time. In other words, changes in
the vertical distribution of powers follow after countries open up and integrate in the global
economy.
Next, we explore the magnitude of the effect of economic globalization upon decentraliza-
tion. Figure 1 plots the variation of Regional Authority Index for different levels of Economic
Globalization. Based on model 2.5 (TSCS with fixed effects and covariates), Figure 1 exhibits
the predicted Regional Authority Index values for a range of economic globalization levels. The
effects are highly significant, but of a moderate magnitude: A transition from a country with
low levels of economic globalization such as Colombia in 2010 (KOF index = 42, a standard
deviation below the sample's mean), to a country with high levels of economic globalization
such as New Zealand in 2010 (KOF index = 72, a standard deviation above the sample's mean)
predicts an increase in the level of Regional authority of around 1.5. This is equivalent to the
differences in the levels of Regional Authority between Australia and Argentina or the United
States and Italy in that same year. As previously said, these are modest effects, which acknowl-
edge that decentralization is a complex process that might be caused by a variety of factors, with
globalization being just one of them.
The theoretical arguments that connect decentralization with globalization essentially refer
to the implications of economic global integration. However, integration can be both in global
markets of goods and services or in global financial markets. To explore whether the impact of
globalization on decentralization is driven by a specific dimension, Table 3 extends the analyses
by using the KOF Trade Globalization index and the KOF Financial Globalization Index.9
Table 3 shows that both dimensions of economic integration have a significant impact on
regional authority. Results seem to support that trade globalization has a somewhat larger
impact, as the coefficient is higher, but we cannot conclude that the effect of globalization is
channeled through a particular dimension of economic globalization.
To improve the robustness of the results, we run further analyses including autoregressive
error terms and a lagged dependent variable. Table 4 displays the first set of robustness checks.
Although Fisher tests rule out the presence of unit roots,10 the table shows that the results are
robust to the inclusion of an autoregressive error term. The economic globalization variable
keeps its magnitude and levels of significance in all models. Table A.3 in the Appendix S1 also
shows that results hold if the series are presented in first differences.
FIGURE 1 Effect of economic
globalization on regional authority
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TABLE 3 Economic globalization (trade and finance) and regional authority
Dependent variable: Regional Authority Index
(3.1) (3.2) (3.3) (3.4) (3.5) (3.6)
TSCS
random-effects
TSCS
fixed-effects
PCSE + country
dummies
TSCS
random-effects
TSCS
fixed-effects
PCSE + country
dummies
KOF Economic
Globalization
(trade) Index
0.0903*** 0.0932*** 0.0932*** 0.0342*** 0.0360*** 0.0360***
(0.00524) (0.00525) (0.00685) (0.00596) (0.00602) (0.00556)
Covariates No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,696 2,696 2,696 1,898 1,898 1,898
R-squared 0.108 0.926 0.305 0.968
Number of countries 78 78 78 74 74 74
(3.7) (3.8) (3.9) (3.10) (3.11) (3.12)
KOF Economic
Globalization
(finance) Index
0.0765*** 0.0768*** 0.0768*** 0.0201*** 0.0206*** 0.0206***
(0.00356) (0.00357) (0.00352) (0.00437) (0.00440) (0.00434)
COVARIATES NO NO NO YES YES YES
Observations 2,619 2,619 2,619 1,869 1,869 1,869
R-squared 0.154 0.928 0.301 0.967
Number of countries 76 76 76 73 73 73
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .1.; **p < .05.; ***p < .01.
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TABLE 4 Models with AR(1)
Dependent variable: Regional Authority Index
(4.1) (4.2) (4.3) (4.4) (4.5) (4.6)
TSCS
random-effects
TSCS
fixed-effects
PCSE + country
dummies
TSCS
random-effects
TSCS
fixed-effects
PCSE + country
dummies
KOF Economic
Globalization
Index
0.0516*** 0.0206** 0.0496*** 0.0330*** 0.0248*** 0.0214**
(0.00838) (0.00906) (0.00976) (0.00940) (0.00816) (0.00972)
AR1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,656 2,579 2,656 1,898 1,824 1,898
R-squared 0.636 0.843
Number of countries 77 77 77 74 74 74
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .1.; **p < .05.; ***p < .01.
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Table 5 displays the second set of robustness checks, which introduce the lagged Regional
Authority Index. The inclusion of lagged dependent variables does not modify the conclusions
of the previous tables. As expected, the size of the coefficient decreases, as the lagged dependent
variable absorbs part of the effect of the globalization variable, and the significance of the coeffi-
cients also decreases slightly. Nonetheless, levels of significance remain in the fixed-effects and
panel-corrected-standard-errors models, and only lose significance in the random-effects models.
This reinforces the robustness of the results. We also address the possibility of reverse causality
and omitted variable bias in Appendix S1.
Results so far have shown that economic globalization has a positive effect on average levels
of regional authority. We now disaggregate our dependent variable and account for the impact
of globalization on its two dimensions: self-rule and shared-rule. The self-rule index measures
the authority exercised by a regional government exclusively over those who live in its territory,
whereas the shared-rule index measures the authority exercised by subnational governments
(or their representatives) in the country as a whole (Marks et al., 2008b). While the former cap-
tures the level of independent authority of subnational governments to rule over their territory
without the interference and participation of the central government (consistent with layer-cake
models of federalism such as the American model), the latter captures the ability of regional
governments of coexercising power at the national level and getting involved in the national
political life. By replicating the previous models using each specific submeasure, we aim to
explore separately the effect of globalization upon increasing or decreasing regional authority to
self-govern and its effect upon the level of co-decision by subnational authorities.
Table 6 displays the results. The most important conclusion is that we find positive and sig-
nificant effects of globalization on both dimensions of decentralization. Perhaps this is not very
surprising, given that the correlation between the two dimensions (self-rule and shared-rule) is
large.11 However, the magnitude of the effects shows that globalization has a stronger impact
on the self-rule dimension than on the shared-rule. This follows from the review of the theoreti-
cal arguments, as some of the benefits associated with decentralization—such as allowing sub-
national governments to manage differentiated demands for public goods or compete for
capital—require significant levels of independent subnational authority (self-rule).
5 | TESTING FOR THE CONTEXTUAL CONDITIONS
Once we have shown that there is a robust positive relationship between globalization and
decentralization, in this section we explore empirically two variables that may moderate that
relationship: demands for regional authority and regional inequalities.
First, and consistent with our theoretical framework, if globalization has an impact on
decentralization by spurring self-determination demands, we should observe that globalization
has a stronger effect on decentralization in those countries where regionalist demands for
authority are more intense. To test this we operationalize demands for regional authority as the
electoral vote share of regionalist parties,12 taken from Teorell et al. (2018). By interacting this
variable with the Economic Globalization measure, we will explore whether the effect of global-
ization upon decentralization is moderated by demands for regional authority. We replicate this
interaction in the three models that we have introduced in the previous empirical section.
Second, we test whether economic contextual conditions may moderate the effect of globali-
zation upon decentralization. In the theoretical section we argued that globalization facilitates
access to external sources of finance and decentralization could facilitate subnational jurisdictions’
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TABLE 5 Models with lagged dependent variable
Dependent variable: Regional Authority Index
(5.1) (5.2) (5.3) (5.4) (5.5) (5.6)
TSCS
random-effects
TSCS
fixed-effects
PCSE + country
dummies
TSCS
random-effects
TSCS
fixed-effects
PCSE + country
dummies
KOF Economic
Globalization Index
−0.000248 0.0121*** 0.0121*** 0.00288 0.00895** 0.00895*
(0.00152) (0.00264) (0.00153) (0.00379) (0.00441) (0.00506)
LDV Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariates No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,645 2,645 2,645 1,893 1,893 1,893
R-squared 0.871 0.989 0.823 0.992
Number of countries 77 77 77 74 74 74
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .1.; **p < .05.; ***p < .01.
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TABLE 6 Globalization and dimensions of regional authority
Dependent variable: Self-rule Index
(6.1) (6.2) (6.3) (6.4) (6.5) (6.6)
TSCS
random-effects
TSCS
fixed-effects
PCSE + country
dummies
TSCS
random-effects
TSCS
fixed-effects
PCSE + country
dummies
KOF Economic
Globalization Index
0.123*** 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.0537*** 0.0540*** 0.0540***
(0.00462) (0.00464) (0.00598) (0.00738) (0.00749) (0.00612)
Covariates No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,656 2,656 2,656 1,898 1,898 1,898
R-squared 0.217 0.921 0.299 0.954
Number of countries 77 77 77 74 74 74
Dependent variable: Shared-rule Index
(6.7) (6.8) (6.9) (6.10) (6.11) (6.12)
TSCS random-
effects
TSCS fixed-
effects
PCSE + country
dummies
TSCS random-
effects
TSCS fixed-
effects
PCSE + country
dummies
KOF Economic
Globalization Index
0.0250*** 0.0250*** 0.0250*** 0.0108*** 0.0113*** 0.0113***
(0.00227) (0.00228) (0.00261) (0.00303) (0.00307) (0.00271)
Covariates No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,656 2,656 2,656 1,898 1,898 1,898
R-squared 0.045 0.915 0.086 0.964
Number of countries 77 77 77 74 74 74
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .1.; **p < .05.; ***p < .01.
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access to capital by promoting higher economic efficiency and competition. Yet globalization may
also expose countries to a more volatile economic environment and provide incentives for central-
ization of fiscal authority that allows for a redistributive mechanism to be implemented. Accord-
ingly, we expect the relationship between globalization and decentralization to be moderated by
the country's potential regional economic vulnerability. Globalization might provide certain bene-
fits that are better achieved if territorial inequality is low. However, the positive effect of globaliza-
tion upon decentralization should be mitigated where levels of regional inequality are high, as
regional inequalities may increase the need for centralized redistributive institutions (and in turn
for centralized fiscal authority).
To test this second contextual argument we include in our econometric models Selway's
measure of cross-cuttingness between income and geography (income–geography overlap). This
measure was developed by Selway (2011) using survey data and it captures the extent to which
the income cleavage overlaps with geography in each country.13 We use this variable as a proxy
of regional economic inequality: When the index score is low it means that the distribution of
income is independent from the territory (so regional inequality is low), whereas the index
score is high if income and geography cleavages overlap, meaning that the distribution of
income is not independent from geography (so regional inequalities are more pronounced).
Income is correlated with demand for social spending, and this is why we use Selway's measure
to operationalize regional variation in demand for social policy and redistribution. In this case,
as the variable is time-unvarying, we cannot run models with fixed effects, so we run the panel-
corrected-standard-errors (without unit effects), and a cross-sectional time-series feasible gener-
alized least squares (FGLS) regression, alongside the TSCS random-effects model that we have
already been using in previous analyses.
Table 7 displays the results of the empirical test of the contextual arguments. In the panel
above, it can be seen that the interaction between globalization and regionalist vote is positive
and significant across the six models. As the interactions do not show the significance for differ-
ent levels of the independent variable (Brambor, Clark, & Golder, 2006), Figure 2 presents the
marginal effect of globalization for different values of regionalist vote share (simulations taken
from model 7.5). It can be seen that globalization has a positive impact on decentralization
across the whole range of regionalization levels. The default effect of globalization is positive,
even in contexts with low levels of regionalism. However, as regionalist vote increases, the posi-
tive impact of globalization upon decentralization is amplified. On average, the effect of globali-
zation upon decentralization is twice as much in a country where regionalist parties are strong
compared to one where there are no regionalist parties.
Table 7 also displays in the panel below the models that include the interactions of the
income–geography overlap variable with the globalization measures. The interactions between
regional inequality and globalization is negative and highly significant in the fixed effects and
the time series cross-sectional models (only the random-effects models yield insignificant
effects). This result provides indicative evidence that in contexts of high levels of regional
inequality globalization is associated to centralization.
Following again Brambor et al.'s (2006) guidelines, in Figure 3 we plot the marginal effect of
economic globalization for the whole range of regional inequality values (model 7.10). It can be
seen that, consistently with the theoretical expectations, if regional inequality is low (when the
income–geography overlap is low) globalization does encourage decentralization. However, as
inequality increases, the effect changes. In contexts with high levels of inequality, globalization
is negatively associated to decentralization, a finding that corresponds with the expectation that
where regional inequalities are high, countries will have more incentives to centralize fiscal
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authority in order to alleviate the potential negative economic effects of globalization. The
results provide a more nuanced picture of the impact of globalization on decentralization:
Depending on levels of regional inequality, global economic integration is associated to centrif-
ugal, but also centripetal, dynamics. Beramendi's work (2007, 2012) has provided evidence
showing that interregional inequality may result in the development of more decentralized sys-
tems of redistribution, so the empirical findings of the article suggest that further empirical
research is needed to provide a more nuanced account of the relationship between globaliza-
tion, regional inequalities and decentralization.
TABLE 7 Globalization and regional authority: contextual conditions
Dependent variable: Regional Authority Index
(7.1) (7.2) (7.3) (7.4) (7.5) (7.6)
TSCS
random-
effects
TSCS
fixed-
effects
PCSE +
country
dummies
TSCS
random-
effects
TSCS
fixed-
effects
PCSE +
country
dummies
Economic globalization 0.132*** 0.133*** 0.133*** 0.126*** 0.130*** 0.130***
(0.00711) (0.00711) (0.00514) (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0123)
Regionalist parties
vote share
−0.744*** −0.741*** −0.741*** −0.574*** −0.576*** −0.576***
(0.161) (0.162) (0.116) (0.158) (0.157) (0.118)
Interaction 0.00842*** 0.00838*** 0.00838*** 0.00765*** 0.00774*** 0.00774***
(0.00214) (0.00215) (0.00157) (0.00208) (0.00208) (0.00159)
Covariates No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,153 1,153 1,153 878 878 878
R-squared 0.304 0.971 0.295 0.979
Number of countries 35 35 35 35 35 35
(7.7) (7.8) (7.9) (7.10) (7.11) (7.12)
TSCS
random-
effects PCSE FGLS
TSCS
random-
effects PCSE FGLS
Economic globalization 0.328*** 0.328*** 0.175*** 0.399*** 0.399*** 0.102***
(0.0515) (0.0330) (0.0248) (0.0596) (0.0309) (0.0244)
Income-geography
overlap
−17.41 −17.41* −71.95** 71.19*** 71.19*** −37.29
(17.81) (9.509) (27.99) (20.50) (9.063) (25.79)
Interaction −1.228*** −1.228*** −0.0962 −1.698*** −1.698*** −0.204
(0.307) (0.174) (0.143) (0.336) (0.148) (0.130)
Covariates No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,139 2,139 2,139 1,536 1,536 1,536
R-squared 0.228 0.443
Number of countries 60 60 60 58 58 58
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
*p < .1.; **p < .05.; ***p < .01.
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6 | SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
Globalization and decentralization probably represent the most important sources of transfor-
mation of the nation-state during the last decades. Power has migrated from central govern-
ments upward, with the creation of international organizations and economic integration, as
well as downward, with the worldwide devolution of decision-making powers to regional and
local governments. Although these two processes have unfolded simultaneously, the literature
has not yet provided a clear account of how they are related: Do they just happen to take place
at the same time or is there a systematic relationship between the two of them? This article
examines this question by providing a systematic theoretical review of the arguments that con-
nect globalization with (de)centralization and by developing an encompassing empirical analy-
sis of the relationship between the two. In doing so, it contributes to advancing a literature in
which the empirical comparative work has been scarce.
Using data from 78 countries for the 1970–2010 period, our empirical findings show that
integration in global markets encourages a process of institutional adaptation whereby coun-
tries are more likely to devolve decision-making powers to regions. Second, we have explored
empirically the contextual conditions whereby globalization can yield the aforementioned
FIGURE 2 Average marginal
effect of economic globalization on
regional authority by regionalist vote
share
FIGURE 3 Average marginal
effect of economic globalization on
regional authority by income-geography
overlap
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results. We find that while regionalism and ethnic diversity can spur demands for decentraliza-
tion in the face of globalization, high levels of (regional) inequality can actually generate the
reverse effect, as inequality is associated to more centralized territorial structures.
Further research can build on the results presented here and expand the theoretical and
empirical analysis in several ways. First, future theoretical work should try to provide a more
systematic and parsimonious account of the different ways in which globalization might be
related to decentralization, including a separate set of mechanisms for each type of decentrali-
zation (political vs. fiscal) and different dimensions of economic globalization. Second, further
empirical tests of the theoretical mechanisms would help us to have a better understanding of
whether, for instance, it is allocative efficiency or productive efficiency which drives the positive
relation between globalization and regional authority.
Third, in our analysis we have tested separately two contextual variables—the demand for
regional authority and regional inequalities—as moderating variables of the effect of globaliza-
tion upon decentralization. Yet further analysis could explore the way in which both variables
reinforce each other. Additional contextual and institutional variables that can amplify or miti-
gate the effects of globalization on the territorial structure of the state could also be explored in
future work. Of particular interest would be the analysis of the effects of the so-called Great
Recession upon decentralization in a context of hyperglobalization, as qualitative analyses show
that the economic crisis has resulted in the recentralization of certain policy areas and the
establishment of limits to subnational units’ deficit and debt.
Altogether, this article has shed light on the relationship between two of the most important
processes of the last four decades in world politics. States have increasingly integrated in global
markets, allowing power to either migrate to international organizations or simply to be con-
strained by international economic dynamics. At the same time, many countries have transferred
power downward and increased fiscal authority of regional governments. This article has shown
that globalization and decentralization are more than just two simultaneous processes that unfold
during the same period. They are two dynamic processes that are positively correlated.
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ENDNOTES
1 The average KOF globalization index was 39.74 in 1970 and 60.11 in 2010, on a scale from 0 to 100.
2 These authors do find an effect of social globalization on decentralization.
3 Even without the requirement of heterogeneity, evidence shows that as societies have become more affluent
and states have grown, regional authority has also increased (Hooghe & Marks, 2016).
4 Their argument echoes Katzenstein's (1985) foundational study on small states in open economies, which
states that globalization was made politically possible in small democracies because their response to globali-
zation was a system based on cooperation, centralized politics and generous social protection.
5 Trade globalization aggregates de facto trade globalization, which measures the exchange of goods and ser-
vices over long distances (exports and imports of goods and exports and imports of services, both measured as
a share of GDP) and de jure trade globalization, which captures policies that promote trade exchange between
countries. Financial globalization encompasses de facto financial globalization measured by capital flows and
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stocks of foreign assets and liabilities and de jure financial globalization, measured by the openness of a coun-
try to international financial flows and investments (Gygli et al. (2019)).
6 We take this variable from Teorell et al. (2018), which combine Freedom House and Polity indices and create
a democracy measure that ranges from 0 to 10.
7 Tests using the STATA command varsoc that provide the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), the Schwartz-
Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC), the final prediction error (FPE), and the Hannan and Quinn informa-
tion criterion (HQIC) show overwhelmingly that for most panels the most efficient structure is to use one lag.
Notwithstanding this, we have run robustness tests using larger lags, such as five and 10 years, that would
capture an impact of globalization on decentralization that takes longer to deploy its effects, and the results
remain significant.
8 In Appendix S1, we explore further the causality concerns. We run an instrumental variable analysis where
we use as instruments of globalization the geographic distance to London and the British colonial past. Results
remain robust to this specification.
9 In both cases we use the “de facto” versions. For more details, see Gygli et al. (2019).
10 Dickey-Fuller tests reported in Appendix S1 (Table A.2) reject the null hypothesis of all panels containing unit
roots.
11 The correlation is 0.67 for the sample of our analysis.
12 The results are robust to the use of electoral share of ethnic parties or ethnic fractionalization.
13 Selway's index is in fact a measure of cross-cuttingness between income and geography. In other words, the
original variable measures, in a range from 0 to 1, the extent to which the distribution of income is indepen-
dent from the geographic distribution of citizens. To ease the interpretation, we have taken the additive
inverse of the measure (1-crosscuttingness) to have a measure of overlap between both.
REFERENCES
Alesina, A., & Spolaore, E. (1997). On the number and size of nations. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112
(4), 1027–1056.
Arze del Granado, F. J., Martinez-Vazquez, J., & McNab, R. M. (2018). Decentralized governance, expenditure
composition, and preferences for public goods. Public Finance Review, 46, 359–388.
Beck, N., & Katz, J. N. (1996). Nuisance vs. substance: Specifying and estimating time-series-cross-section
models. Political Analysis, 6, 1–36.
Beramendi, P. (2007). Inequality and the territorial fragmentation of solidarity. International Organization, 61(4),
783–820.
Beramendi, P. (2012). The political geography of inequality: Regions and redistribution. Cambridge University Press.
Bolton, P., & Roland, G. (1997). The breakup of nations: A political economy analysis. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 112(4), 1057–1090.
Brambor, T., Clark, W. R., & Golder, M. (2006). Understanding interaction models: Improving empirical ana-
lyses. Political Analysis, 14, 63–82.
Brancati, D. (2014). Another great illusion: The advancement of separatism through economic integration. Politi-
cal Science Research and Methods, 2(1), 69–95.
Brennan, G., & Buchanan, J. M. (1980). The power to tax: Analytic foundations of a fiscal constitution. Cambridge
University Press.
Castles, F. G. (1999). Decentralization and the post-war economy. European Journal of Political Research, 36(1),
27–53.
de Mello, L. R. (2005). Globalization and fiscal federalism: Does openness constrain subnational budget imbal-
ances? Public Budgeting & Finance, 25(1), 1–14.
Desmet, K., Le Breton, M., Ortuño-Ortín, I., & Weber, S. (2011). The stability and breakup of nations: A quantita-
tive analysis. Journal of Economic Growth, 16(3), 183–213.
Dreher, A. (2006). Does globalization affect growth? Empirical evidence from a new index. Applied Economics,
38, 1091–1110.
Dreher, A., Gaston, N., & Martens, P. (2008).Measuring globalization: Gauging its consequences. New York: Springer.
20 JURADO AND LEÓN
Filippetti, A., & Sacchi, A. (2016). Decentralization and economic growth reconsidered: The role of regional
authority. Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy., 34(8), 1793–1824.
Fisman, R., & Gatti, R. (2002). Decentralization and corruption: Evidence across countries. Journal of Public Eco-
nomics, 83(3), 325–345.
Garrett, G., & Rodden, J. (2006). Globalization and fiscal decentralization. In M. Kahler & D. A. Lake (Eds.), Gov-
ernance in a global economy: Political authority in transition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Gygli, S., Haelg, F., Potrafke, N., & Sturm, J.-E. (2019). The KOF globalisation index – Revisited. Review of Inter-
national Organizations.
Hays, J. C. (2003). Globalization and capital taxation in consensus and majoritarian democracies. World Politics,
56(1), 79–113.
Hellmann, T. F., Murdock, K. C., & Stiglitz, J. E. (2000). Liberalization, moral hazard in banking, and prudential
regulation: Are capital requirements enough? American Economic Review, 90(1), 147–165.
Hellwig, T. (2014). Globalization and mass politics: Retaining the room to maneuver. Cambridge University Press.
Hellwig, T. (2019). Globalization, electoral change, and representation. In R. Rohrschneider & J. Thomassen
(Eds.), Oxford handbook of political representation in Liberal democracies. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hooghe, L., & Marks, G. (2016). Community, scale, and regional governance: A postfunctionalist theory of gover-
nance (Vol. 2). Oxford University Press.
Hooghe, L., Marks, G., & Schakel, A. H. (2008). Special issue on measuring regional authority. Regional and Fed-
eral Studies, 18(2–3), 111–302.
Hooghe, L., Marks, G., Schakel, A. H., Osterkatz, S. C., Niedzwiecki, S., & Shair-Rosenfield, S. (2016). Measuring
regional authority: A postfunctionalist theory of governance (Vol. I). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hueglin, T. (1999). Early modern concepts for a late modern world: Althusius on community and federalism.
Waterloo, Ont: Wilfrid Laurier Press.
Hwang, W., & Lee, H. (2014). Globalization, factor mobility, partisanship, and compensation policies. Interna-
tional Studies Quarterly, 58(1), 92–105.
Jun, J. S., & Wright, D. S. (Eds.). (1996). Globalization and decentralization: Institutional contexts, policy issues,
and intergovernmental relations in Japan and the United States. Georgetown University Press.
Katzenstein, P. J. (1985). Small states in world markets: Industrial policy in Europe. Cornell University Press.
Lane, J.-E., & Ersson, S. (1999). Politics and society in Western Europe. London: Sage Publications.
Leibrecht, M., Klien, M., & Onaran, Ö. (2011). Globalization, welfare regimes and social protection expenditures
in Western and Eastern European countries. Public Choice, 148(3–4), 569–594.
Marks, G., Hooghe, L., & Schakel, A. H. (2008a). Patterns of regional authority. Regional and Federal Studies, 18
(2–3), 167–181.
Marks, G., Hooghe, L., & Schakel, A. H. (2008b). Measuring regional authority. Regional and Federal Studies, 18
(2-3), 111–121.
Marshall, J., & Fisher, S. D. (2015). Compensation or constraint? How different dimensions of economic globali-
zation affect government spending and electoral turnout. British Journal of Political Science, 45(2), 353–389.
Martinez-Vazquez, J., & Timofeev, A. (2009). A fiscal perspective of state rescaling. Cambridge Journal of Regions,
Economy and Society, 2(1), 85–105.
Meinhard, S., & Potrafke, N. (2012). The globalization–welfare state nexus reconsidered. Review of International
Economics, 20(2), 271–287.
Mosley, L., & Uno, S. (2007). Racing to the bottom or climbing to the top? Economic globalization and collective
labor rights. Comparative Political Studies, 40(8), 923–948.
Oates, W. E. (1972). Fiscal federalism. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
Pandya, S. (2010). Labor markets and the demand for foreign direct investment. International Organization, 64,
389–409.
Qian, Y., & Weingast, B. R. (1997). Federalism as a commitment to reserving market incentives. Journal of Eco-
nomic perspectives, 11(4), 83–92.
Sambanis, N., & Milanovic, B. (2011). Explaining the demand for sovereignty. (World Bank Policy Research work-
ing paper no. WPS 5888).
Sambanis, N. (2006). Globalization, decentralization and secession. Globalization and Self-Determination: Is the
Nation-State Under Siege? In M. Kahler & D. A. Lake (Eds.), Governance in a global economy: Political
authority in transition (pp. 199–232). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
JURADO AND LEÓN 21
Schakel, A. H. (2008). Validation of the regional authority index. Regional and Federal Studies, 18(2–3), 143–166.
Selway, J. S. (2011). The measurement of cross-cutting cleavages and other multidimensional cleavage structures.
Political Analysis, 19(1), 48–65.
Simmons, B. A., & Elkins, Z. (2004). The globalization of liberalization: Policy diffusion in the international polit-
ical economy. American Political Science Review, 98(1), 171–189.
Stegarescu, D. (2005). Public sector decentralization: Measurement, concepts and recent international trends. Fis-
cal Studies, 26(3), 301–333.
Stegarescu, D. (2009). The effects of economic and political integration on fiscal decentralization: Evidence from
OECD countries. Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue Canadienne d’économique, 42(2), 694–718.
Teorell, J., Dahlberg, S., Holmberg, S., Rothstein, B., Pachon, N. A., & Svensson, R. (2018). The quality of govern-
ment standard dataset, version Jan18. The Quality of Government Institute: University of Gothenburg.
SUPPORTING INFORMATION
Additional supporting information may be found online in the Supporting Information section
at the end of this article.
How to cite this article: Jurado I, León S. Economic globalization and decentralization:
A centrifugal or centripetal relationship? Governance. 2020;1–22. https://doi.org/10.1111/
gove.12496
22 JURADO AND LEÓN
